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NATURAL RESOURCES: FEDERAL CONTROL OVER
INDIAN TIMBER
Joe D. Diilsa ver
Federal control over Indian timber dates back to the beginning of
government control over Indian tribes.' As early as 1861 tribes
were entering into contracts for the sale of the timber on their
lands.' The purpose of this paper is to provide an examination of
the federal government's Indian timber policy from 1861 to the
present. The focus will be on the statutes, regulations, and court
decisions that molded this federal timber policy.
Historical Development
After the Chippewas entered into an agreement in 1861, there
are several instances of individual tribes contracting to sell timber
or timber products. Among them were the Stockbridge and
Munsee Indians next to the Menominee Reservation in Wisconsin
and the Tulalip Reservation in Washington.' In 1873 United States
v. Cook' addressed the extent of use that Indians could make of
their timber. The Court noted that the timber could not be cut by
them for the purpose of sale alone. It had to be connected with the
clearing of the land to make it more suitable for agriculture.6 Two
other points in the case are also significant. First, the statement of
the policy that Indians only had the right to occupancy of the land
with the presumption against cutting and selling the timber.7 The
Indians were only entitled to wood necessary for their own per-
sonal use. The fee of the timber land remained in the federal
government.8 Second, Cook adds that the government has the
right to maintain whatever action is necessary to recover for
timber wrongfully sold. In this case the action was replevin.9
On February 16, 1889, Congress passed a statute which directed
executive action toward Indian timber.' ° The act gave the Presi-
dent discretionary power to authorize Indians on tribal lands "to
fell, cut, remove, sell or otherwise dispose cif the dead timber stan-
ding or fallen ... for the sole benefit of such Indian or Indians.""
The significance of this statute was the declaration that at least
some of the timber on Indian lands could be used in a direct, com-
mercial sense.
Three cases arose between the enactment of the February 16,
1889, statute and the next major statute in 1910." The first, Pine
River Logging Co. v. United States, confirmed the earlier holding
of Cook." In 1907 the Supreme Court decided United States v.
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Paine Lumber Co." Here, the Court recognized that tribes have a
vested interest in their lands by treaty which authorized the cut-
ting of timber for sale and not for the improvement of the land."
Also, approval of the Secretary of the Interior was not needed
before the actions were taken.16 The language of Judge McKenna's
opinion expresses vividly the right to cut and sell timber without
designating the land for later cultivation.
We encounter difficulties and baffling inquiries when we con-
cede a cutting for clearing the land for cultivation, and deny
it for other purpose[s]. At what time shall we date the
preparation for cultivation and make the right to sell the
timber depend? Must the axe immediately precede the plow
and do no more than keep out of its way? And if that close
relation be not always maintained, may the purpose of an
allottee'7 be questioned and referred to some advantage other
than the cultivation of the land, and his title or that of his
vendee to the timber denied? Nor does the argument which
makes the occupation of the land a test of title to the timber
seem to us more adequate to justify the qualification of the
Indians' rights .... The allotments, as we have said, were to
be of arable lands useless, may be, certainly improved by be-
ing clear of their timber, and yet, it is insisted, that this im-
provement may not be made, though it have the additional
inducement of providing means for the support of the Indians
and their families. We are unable to assent to this view."
The Supreme Court in 1908 clarified the holding of Paine in Starr
v. Campbell.'9
A statute of major importance was passed in 1910 concerning
the function of governmental administration of tribal timber."0
Chapter 431 of 33 Statutes at Large delineated the procedure the
government was to follow. Section 7 stated: "That the mature liv-
ing and dead and down timber on unallotted lands of any Indian
reservation may be sold under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of the Interior, and the proceeds from such sales shall be
used for the benefit of the Indians of the reservation in such man-
ner as he may direct."'" Section 8 adds that the timber may be sold
with the consent of the government.2
The 1910 law reflects several key ideas. First, it establishes the
policy of governmental approval over the sale of timber. The
policy reverses Paine.' Section 7 also allows the Secretary of the
Interior to use the proceeds of the timber sales for the benefit of
the Indians." While the statute points to the fact that it is limited to
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol5/iss2/9
unallotted lands, later court decisions indicate that the Secretary's
use of timber proceeds applies to allotted lands as well."
A series of Department of the Interior decisions and court cases
after 1910 have further delineated the government's policy of In-
dian timber regulation. United States v. Algoma Lumber Co.'
dealt with whether the government or the Klamath Indians were
responsible for the contracts of sale of timber made by the Indians
for the sale of that timber. The Court decided that the Indians
were the binding contractual parties. The opinion also included
several reflections on the governmental control of Indian timber.
First, Algoma agreed with Chapter 431 of 33 Statutes at Large. 2'
The court also indicated that only the beneficial interest in the
land on which the timber was located remained in the tribe.'
Eastman v. United States9 likewise dealt with the basic provi-
sions of Chapter 431 of 33 Statutes at Large. Eastman centered on
allotted Indian lands, while Algoma seemed to focus on both
allotted and unallotted lands." The Court held that it was the in-
tent of Congress to "prescribe definitely the terms" upon which the
Indians could do business with their timber.' The intent of the
statute was to "broaden rights of Indians as to sale of timber on
lands valuable chiefly for timber. 32 Also stated in Chapter 431 of
33 Statutes at Large was that the Secretary of the Interior could
refuse "his consent to such a sale [of timber] without giving any
reason," but that such consent could not be withheld based on
"imposition of restrictions which he has no power to make."'
A memorandum from the Solicitor of the Department of the In-
terior in 1948 expanded the right of secretarial approval to
Alaskan Indian timber. The question put to the Solicitor was
whether a tribe whose possessory rights extended into the Tongass
National Forest could legally sell the timber without the approval
of the Secretary of the Interior.- The answer was that the Indians
could not sell the timber without the consent of the government. 6
On October 29, 1953, the Solicitor in another memo echoed the
same idea as the 1948 statement.37 In 1953, however, the area was
not Alaska but the Pacific Northwest. The memo asserted that the
tribal timber sales contracts were not governmental ones but were
Indian concerns.3 8 This idea reflects the basic premise of Algoma."
The role of the government as supervisor was still present under
the plenary'° power of the United States." Still another memo 2
echoed the same governmental responsibilities toward the control
of Indian timber.
The problem of taxation, specifically capital gains treatment,
was raised in the 1955 case of Squire v. Capoeman."' The problem
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centered on income from the sale by the government of standing
timber on allotted land in the Quinault Indian Reservation. The
ultimate fee was held in trust by the government. The Supreme
Court concluded that because of the provisions of Sections 5 and 6
of the General Allotment Act," an Indian allottee did not have to
pay any tax on his land." Only when the federal government had
conveyed a patent in fee simple would the restrictions on taxation
be removed."1
Mole Lake Band v. United States 7 mentioned briefly the rela-
tionship of the government and Indians as to timber resources.
The Court stated that Indians were entitled to the proceeds of
timber from their lands. The responsibility of the government was
to administer the money received from the proceeds of the timber
cut on reservation lands." Two Solicitor's Opinions, in 1957 ° and
1950,' focus on more aspects of the federal-Indian timber situa-
tion. The 1957 opinion reviewed the procedure of the government
to redetermine stumpage prices upon the finding of changed
marketing conditions, technological developments, or "character
of the operations."'" The Solicitor also reaffirmed the Algoma 2
contention that contracts for Indian timber were not public but
private contracts between the Indians and the contracting parties."
The 1958 memo pointed out that the government should not ap-
prove the sale of allotted timber without the approval of all the
owners of the land.m But the memo also stated that if the timber
had been "damaged by fire, insects, or disease" and might become
worthless within a short period of time, the part-owner could sell
to protect from further loss.55
Barclay v. United States was a 1964 case from Oregon which
also touched on federal control of Indian timber.6 The June 25,
1.910, statute7 recognizing the power to control the sale of Indian
timber is pinpointed." The decision also confirmed the authority
of the government to "approve or disapprove sales made by allot-
tees who alone could transfer ownership of timber on their land."5'
The power of the allottee over the disposition of the timber was
further demonstrated by the Court stating that a government
survey and selection of trees to cut had "no effect" as to the sale of
timber until the allottees agree to sell it.'
A final case spotlighting federal control of Indian timber was
Quinault Allottee Assoc. v. United States.' This was a class ac-
tion by owners of Indian allotments on the Quinault reservation in
Washington. They were seeking to recover administrative charges
which the government had deducted from proceeds of sales of
timber from the allotments of the reservation.6 2 The Court of
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Claims found, inter alia, that the government could charge ad-
ministrative fees from the proceeds of timber sales.' These fees
arose from the administration of the trust relationship with the In-
dians by the government. The charges levied did not constitute a
tax in violation of the tax exemption status afforded by the
General Allotment Act of 1887."
The cases and materials discussed supra indicate a uniform
general approach by the government to the administration of In-
dian timber. Felix Cohen's overview of this control seems on
point, even though it was written more than thirty years ago.6
It must therefore, be taken as settled law at the present time,
that in the absence of specific language to the contrary the
establishment of an Indian reservation for the use and oc-
cupancy of the Indians conveys to the Indians an interest in
the timber of the reservation as complete as is the tribal in-
terest in the land itself, that the cutting and alienation of such
timber is subject to congressional legislation, and that the
wrongful acts of individual Indians, vendees of timber, or
agents of the United States Governments cannot deprive the
Indian tribe of its interest in tribal timber, or of its right to
receive the proceeds of timber cut and alienated without con-
sent of the tribe.
Current Federal Regulations
Thus the focus of this study so far has been on the general prin-
ciples of federal control of Indian timber largely from a historical
development perspective. The following section will provide a
discussion of the current federal rules which control Indian
timber. Title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations deals with In-
dians and Sections 141, 142, and 144 specifically cover timber.
Section 141' deals with "general forest regulations." Section 14267
controls "sale of lumber and other forest products" produced by
Indian enterprises from the forests on Indian reservations. Section
144" is specifically directed to the "sale of forest products, Red
Lake Indian Reservation, Minn."'
Subsections (1)7' and (2)7 of Section 141 cover definitions and
scope. The objectives of the whole section appear in subsection
(3 ).7 These objectives include management, self-sustaining Indian
communities "highest and best use of the land," and meeting the
"present and future financial needs of the owner and his heirs."'73
Subsection (4)7 deals with sustained yield management of the
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timber and subsection (5)75 with cutting restrictions. Subsection
(6)76 covers "Indian Operations" and is prefaced with the line "Sub-
ject to approval by the Secretary." Timber sales from unallotted
and allotted lands are in subsection (7)." Subsections (8) through
(16)78 handle the mechanisms of contracting and selling the timber.
The actual cutting of the timber is in subsections (17), (19), and
(20).' 9 The allowance for deduction of administrative expenses is
authorized under subsection (18 )." The final subsections (21),"l(22).8" and (23)' cover fire protection, trespass, and appeals of
timber contracts.
As mentioned above, Section 142 addresses the sale of timber
and timber products by Indian enterprises from reservation
timber. The subsection breakdown is as follows": Definitions are
covered in (1). The meaning of "forest products" includes
"lumber, lath, shingles, crating, ties, bolts, logs, bark, pulpwood,
or other marketable materials obtained from forests and authoriz-
ed for removal by the Indian enterprises." Subsections 142(2) and
(3) are housekeeping devices for the application of the regulation.
The selling of the products in the open market is in subsection (4).
Advertising provisions are included in (5) and (6). Subsections (7)
through (12) contain the general procedures for handling the
mechanics of the purchase and sale of the forest products.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to provide an overview of
federal control of Indian timber. This included a look at the
historical background of the control, cases, and memorandum
opinions of the Department of the Interior, and ended with a brief
discussion of the federal regulations pertinent to the immediate
functioning of governmental control of Indian timber. However,
there is one additional area, the future, that deserves comment. A
heuristic examination such as referring to the future policy of the
federal government toward Indian timber does nothing but invite
conjecture. Several suggestions or insights have already
developed. One source pointed out that "a tribal corporation or
agent with a profit incentive would seem to offer the best chance
of maximizing return and assuring a continuous yield (from the
timber). "' Another suggested that the development of Indian
lands policy and the formulation of that policy is tied directly to
one circumstance: the relationship of the various tribes with the
federal government. The shape of that relationship will be the key
to the future federal policy toward the control of Indian timber.
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